In Stanovich’s “Rationality and the Reflective Mind” Stanovich provides ample evidence that the reflective mind is in fact a Type 1 process, but this is not its position in his model. The reflective mind sends brief signals base on thinking disposition to the algorthmic mind which performs simulation and serial associative processing. The decoupling of secondary from primary representation and the inhibition of Type 1 response circuitry are the resource intensive functions here, both handled by the algorithmic mind. The reflective mind itself is not responsible then for effortful processing, but is merely a spontaneous impulse by certain aspects of temperament. This sounds to me far more analogous to the effortless, fast, emotional response of Type 1 processing.
It seems to me the focus on Type 2 processing should more or less be jettisoned from the model if the goal is normative rational response. As Stanovich himself says the highest level of training is likely to overlearn the rules of rational reasoning to the point where they become like a Type 1 response. Rationality should be developed just as one develops aesthetic appreciation and moral refinement, to the extent to which this is done at all. What do you think about this? What have you done to improve your rationality?
What is this?
>>2
I wanted to discuss a book I read so I wrote a letter, put it in a bottle, and then threw it into the ocean.
What have you done to improve your rationality?
I usually just tune down my emotions until it's flatlined.
Otherwise someone else controls your mind
Like going on textboards. I don't know anymore.
さようなら
I started reading Thinking and Deciding. It seems the best I currently have available in terms of learning applied decisions theory, although I haven't enjoyed it so far. I have hopes the rigor will increase as the text goes progresses.
I do daily mindful meditation to regular self-retrospection. I always make sure to distinguish fact, conjecture, and opinion. This is what I do to keep myself thinking as clearly as possible.
>>6
Meditation interests me. I've read a technique book and a number of studies on its influence on executive-functioning. However I only meditated for a short time, and was not particularly skilled. I eventually ruled out the effect of meditation on executive-functioning. I could not find sound evidence of far-transfer existing in other domains, and failed to see why meditation would be an exception. With the information gained from this book, I need to reassess the plausibility of this.
It seems reasonable that while far-transfer of skills such as piano influencing mathematics ability are unlikely that different activities can influence our thinking dispositions. For example it might be that meditation does not improve the ability of the algorithmic mind to perform the decoupling from serial associative cognition (mind wandering) but that it does change the patterns of thought in the reflective mind which send the decoupling signal to the algorithmic mind.
>>5
I've continued reading this book, and continued to be rather unimpressed. The only thing of value I've extracted in the first 75 pages is a pointer to the name Herbert A. Simon who I might read at a later date. Still I have hope that it might improve.
I have learned to distrust people who claim to be rational. It is supposed to mean that they are impartial and undeniably right, but in practice they are always full of shit. It is not a mistake that the verb "rationalize" has such negative connotations. It is a public secret that rationality is nothing but a desperate attempt to justify the existent. I have no intention to partake in this deception.
>>9
Rationality is supposed to be a reference to a person's ability to think through their situation. Since all people have limited and subjective human perspectives, it's reasonable to suspect flaws within everybody's rationality. This doesn't mean that "rationality" should be dismissed as meaningless work, it just means we need to understand that it is the nature of humans to be less than perfect in how we act and think. As for me, I always make sure to distinguish fact, conjecture, and opinion. I always make sure to distinguish that all people have hidden (unconscious) motivations that affect themselves.
>>9
I agree with your observations but disagree with your second to last sentence. Personally my interest is in more effective evaluation, and computation rather than justification.
>>5
I threw this book out after around 120 pages. It is effectively a list of biases and normative models without any sort of overarching theory, or applications (classically psychology in style). This list is not even useful as reference material as it only briefly introduces each domain rather than being near-exhaustive as one might expect. This doesn't help me, so I'm looking for alternatives now.
The very reason the rational world appears more solid than this world is it's an entirely human creation. When people tread the halls of rationality they are impressed by the regularity of the columns, the smooth marble, the sureness of the foundations, but the churning cosmos is completely indifferent to this fine building and regularly intrudes on it. This extends to the oft-cited examples of casting bridges across expanses using mathematics, and the design and implementation of computers. There's no permanence to the so-called eternal laws holding up the bridge, and there's nothing logical about digital computation. The brain is an organ at the service of life, it is not "above life" as it likes to tell itself. The moment we came to believe we were rational creatures was the greatest act of self-deception in human history.
I just thought of another flaw I see with the reasoning of Rationality and the Reflective Mind. Namely often what we want is for Type 2 reasoning to establish the environment for Type 1 reasoning or at least serial associative cognition rather than the other way around. This can be felt in sort of epiphany where after working on a problem for some time the solution suddenly appears to us.
>>13
Seems reasonable to me.
Since all people have limited and subjective human perspectives, it's reasonable to suspect flaws within everybody's rationality.
I disagree that it is reasonable. In fact, that's my issue. People that suspect that the reason others disagree with them is because they don't think rationally, or not rationally enough. But it is my opinion that this is the wrong approach, precisely because of what you have said. If rationality is the ability to think through your situation, and your situation is to have a limited and subjective perspective, then it makes much more sense to assume that the issue is not of rationality, but perspective. While discussing Napoleon's campaign of 1815, Clausewitz makes the following remark, which I think is highly relevant:
In analyzing strategy the main thing is always to put yourself precisely into the position of the individual who had to take action. This is often very difficult to do, of course. The vast majority of strategic criticisms would either disappear completely or be reduced to minor, theoretical differences if writers would want or be able to analyze all situations in such a manner.
>>10
This is a non-standard definition of rationality. Typically it is divided between instrumental rationality, maximizing one's ends, and epistemic rationality, thinking inline with reality. Regarding >>15 I think the matter of perspective would be part of epistemic rationality and what >>10 is speaking of is a means and not the end (not even a necessary condition as mentioned in >>1 Type 1 can be rational).
I still don't really understand why >>9 is the case, although I still agree as mentioned in >>11. My guess/hope is that so called rationalists tend to just upload a lot of california ideology (sciencism, western economics, and political "science") into their brain and that some of the mechanisms are salvageable. For example despite the paradoxes in logic and probability having an exceptional intuitive understanding of these seems valuable.
bollywood and bangalore ideology shitting streets > hollywood and silicon valley ideology trashcan
I just finished revising my notes on CFAR's Participant Handbook the book can be had here: https://rationality.org/files/CFAR_Handbook_2021-01.pdf There were a few sections I thought might be harmful, and I think the techniques on the whole are too accepting of implicit goals. I did however learn several useful techniques, and gained many pointers to further resources. I suspect these resources will help me to build a more sound model of the functioning of the Type 1 reasoning, and give me better opportunities to exploit it.
While this work is entirely concerned with instrumental rationality, it seems that the methods themselves are carefully constructed so as to hint at the same sort of underlying thinking dispositions as support evidential rationality. It's as if they give you certain results you can see directly so that you continue with their research program to address the way you solve problems more generally. It is noticeably missing the traditional quantitative techniques associated with this community (no mention of Bayes' Theorem!?), perhaps these more traditional techniques are expected to be had from The Sequences?